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Abstract:  
“Collateral Thoughts” is part of a special issue edited by Professor James Allan, who invited 
and challenged a group of scholars to select and discuss a favourite law review article. I 
chose “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” because it is the most 
influential article to date in the Charter of Rights and Freedom’s relatively short history 
(since 1982). I call this reflection “Collateral Thoughts” because my interest is less in the 
merits of dialogue theory than in its remarkable impact, at home in Canada as well as 
abroad, in the broader reaches of comparative constitutionalism and constitutional theory. 
In the main, this reflection asks how and why “dialogue” became a runaway concept, and 
considers what that tells us about the nature and formation of constitutional theory. It 
shows that Dialogue was fundamentally connected to Canada’s catharsis of rights, in 1982 
and in the early years of Charter interpretation. That is why its claim that the legitimacy 
battles which define American judicial review are irrelevant – because Canada’s system of 
rights protection is based on “dialogue” – was so explosive. Not only did this article 
command attention in Canada, the concept of dialogue would be “reified”, castigated and 
deeply analyzed by scholars and Commonwealth jurisdictions who wondered whether 
weaker or weak-form judicial review was institutionally possible. Much like other theories 
in the US constitutional tradition, Dialogue responded to controversy by theorizing and 
attempting to legitimize review. Despite failing in its objective to eliminate legitimacy 
concerns about review, Dialogue catalyzed a national and international movement in 
constitutional thought. 
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COLLATERAL THOUGHTS ON DIALOGUE’S LEGACY AS 
METAPHOR AND THEORY: A FAVOURITE FROM CANADA 
JAMIE CAMERON*
James Allan’s challenge to select and discuss a favourite law review article was 
daunting at first. With constitutional law across time as the field of choice, 
impossibility and instinct directed a choice close to home, in the literature on Canada’s 
1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 During the selection process two prospects 
were entertained and then set aside in favour of an obvious choice, the article that 
sparked a scholarship of its own: ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures’.2 
‘Charter Dialogue’ entered the fray in 1997, when Canadian debate about the 
follies of judicial activism had reached an apex.3 In that setting, the authors advanced 
the calming proposition that review is not a threat after all because the judiciary does 
not exercise a veto on constitutional rights; hence the article’s subtitle, ‘Perhaps the 
Charter Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All’.  ‘Dialogue’ revealed that indignant huffing 
on judicial activism had overlooked a vital point, namely that review simply marks the 
beginning of a dialogue between the courts and legislatures on how best to reconcile 
rights and democratic interests.4 By reconstituting review as a process in which the 
courts and legislatures share authority, ‘Dialogue’ had magnetic appeal, not least 
because it addressed and claimed to eliminate profound concerns about judicial 
activism under the Charter.    
‘Charter Dialogue’ began a movement in constitutional thought which, albeit 
with less intensity today, intrigues us still, some twenty years later.5 Choosing it as the 
‘favourite’ is not an endorsement but a matter of intellectual curiosity about a 
phenomenon that came, unexpectedly, to dominate discourse.6 In reification as in 
castigation, dialogue has been persistent and resilient; it has been a force in Canada 
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I thank James Allan for inviting me to
join this special issue of law review favourites, and acknowledge the valuable research
assistance of Mr. John Wilson (JD 2016) and Mr Tanner Stanley (JD 2018).
1  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982m c.11. 
2  P Hogg and A Bushell Thornton, ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures – or 
Perhaps the Charter Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75 
(‘Charter Dialogue’ or ‘Dialogue’).  Also considered were Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, ‘Will 
Women Judges Really Make a Difference?’ (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 507 (sparking 
a firestorm of controversy); and S Choudhry, ‘The Lochner Era and Comparative 
Constitutionalism’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (providing a deep and 
scholarly approach to comparative Canadian and American constitutionalism). 
3  See, eg, below nn 11, 12.  
4  Hogg and Thornton, above n 2, 105. 
5  Most recently, see A Kavanaugh, ‘The Lure and the Limits of Dialogue’ (‘The Lure and the 
Limits’) (2015) University of Toronto Law Journal 83 and A Young, ‘Exporting Dialogue: 
Critical Reflections on Canada’s ‘Commonwealth’ Model of Human Rights Protections’ in R 
Albert and D Cameron (eds) Canada in the World: Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian 
Constitution (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2017). Note that in this article, 
‘Dialogue’ refers to the law review article and ‘dialogue’ to the theoretical concept that emerged 
in the follow-up scholarship. 
6  My engagement with ‘Charter Dialogue’ has been limited. See J Cameron, ‘Dialogue and 
Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Comment on R v Mills’ (2001) 38 Alberta Law Review 
1051; see also ‘Charter Dialogue: Ten Years Later’ (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (‘Ten 
Years Later’) (special issue on dialogue as editor-in-chief of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal). 
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and the broader discipline of comparative constitutionalism. Explaining that 
phenomenon – why it attracted and polarized in Canada, but also how the article and 
its concept of dialogue became a ‘thought leader’ in constitutional law – is what 
interests me here.7 
 This reflection does not rehearse or choose sides between dialogue’s 
innumerable advocates, opponents and ambivalents, or catalogue the unwieldy 
literature on the point. In sketching its legacy, the discussion also steers away from 
engaging with well-known lines of debate on whether dialogue achieved closure on 
legitimacy, or has salience as an explanation, concept or theory of review. In exploring 
the phenomenon, the discussion turns in a more tangential direction to collateral 
aspects of its legacy: how dialogue became a runaway concept, and what that tells us 
about how theory and its roots in conflicts about constitutional interpretation. Quite 
apart from ‘Dialogue’’s merits these points have significance, and if this discussion is 
unlikely to alter views about dialogue perhaps it can enrich understanding of the 
concept, and how an article which claimed modest descriptive findings became a 
constitutional blockbuster.  
 
 
I   CONSTITUTIONAL PHENOMENON 
 
Constitutional theories – and metaphors too – invariably emerge from cathartic 
events or shifts in the life of a constitution. If the objective of theory is in principle to 
foster the search for abstract, timeless truth, discourse on what a constitution means 
and who has the authority to interpret meaning follows the pattern. In addition, 
constitutional theory is notably grounded in the cycles of crisis and controversy around 
interpretation and review.8 Footnote 4, neutral principles, and democracy and distrust 
are among the leading examples of theory that was forged in the crucible of 
transformative change.9 With less drama, ‘Charter Dialogue’ follows a similar pattern, 
though with one difference: while the US scholarship counts multiple review theories, 
‘Dialogue’ is a singular theory – or phenomenon – in the comparatively recent 
literature on the Charter.   
‘Dialogue’’s surprising magnetism, which would attain global proportions in 
constitutional law, has been attributed to the ‘lure of the metaphor’ and its ‘seductively 
simple rejoinder’ to the dilemma of review.10 The phenomenon may owe its fame in 
part to a concept that was ‘impossible to resist’, but more poignantly ‘Dialogue’ was 
fundamentally connected to Canada’s catharsis of rights: enactment of the Charter in 
1982 and the ‘activist’ course of decision-making in the Charter’s early years. The 
article channelled foundational divisions about the wisdom of adopting constitutional 
                                                          
7  P Hogg, A Bushell Thornton and W Wright, ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited – Or “Much Ado 
About Metaphors”’ (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 (‘Charter Dialogue Revisited’) in 
‘Ten Years Later’ at 54 (addressing complaints about the metaphor and replying that ‘our critics 
should deal with … the phenomenon, rather than making “too much ado about metaphors”’; 
emphasis added). I agree that dialogue is aptly described as a phenomenon and have adopted it 
here. 
8  B Friedman, ‘The Cycles of Constitutional Theory’ (2004) 67 Law and Contemporary Problems 
149 (claiming that constitutional theory necessarily reacts to critical events in constitutional 
interpretation). 
9  Footnote 4 followed the court-packing crisis of 1937; see U.S. v Carolene Products Ltd. (1938); 
neutral principles followed Brown v Board of Education, the Court’s 1954 desegregation 
decision; see H Wechsler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’ (1959-60) 73 
Harvard Law Review 1; and John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review (1980) emerged from the 1973 abortion decision in Roe v Wade. 
10  A Kavanaugh, above n 5, 84. 
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rights, and re-directed primal beliefs on that threshold question to a concept of 
dialogue aimed at confirming that the Charter was not, and is not, a threat to Canadian 
democracy.   
‘Charter Dialogue’ appeared at a time of ongoing hectoring about Supreme Court 
decision-making and support for the override as a check on judicial activism.11 The 
stakes were not quite as high as they had been in 1982, but almost. Opponents of the 
Charter who maintained that constitutional rights would fundamentally alter Canadian 
democracy for the worse had not changed their minds. If anything, the jurisprudence in 
the early years confirmed and even exacerbated some of their worst fears about the 
Charter’s impact on legal and political culture. Over-wrought rhetoric about the rise of 
the judiciary and the loss of democratic function was commonplace.12 To some, the 
Charter was quite simply a juggernaut.   
‘Charter Dialogue’ drew on two strategies to defend the Charter from damaging 
charges of judicial activism. In the first instance, the authors appealed to patriotic 
instinct in a masterful way. The authors understood that to be persuasive ‘Dialogue’ 
had to create distance between Charter review and the much-maligned US culture of 
judicial activism. To place that in perspective, it is a longstanding article of faith in 
Canadian culture that ‘we the north’ are different.13 That belief trades on a strain of 
anti-Americanism which forms part of the bedrock in Canadian constitutionalism, and 
dates from Confederation. In 1867, Canada distinguished its model of federalism from 
what was seen as the flawed US example, which had caused a civil war, and claimed a 
distinctive aptitude for compromise in doing so.14 In an echo from that past, Canada 
needed to make its form of rights protection different from that in the US Bill of 
Rights, on which the Charter was unarguably modelled.  
Against a backdrop of concerns about the Charter’s Americanizing impact, it is 
no coincidence that ‘Charter Dialogue’ opened with a précis of judicial review in the 
US, one which pointed to the intransigence of an anti-majoritarian objection that could 
neither be resolved nor ignored.15 Readers were quickly told that fatal objections to the 
legitimacy of review in the US had been averted in Canada, where ‘Dialogue’’s data 
showed that legislatures could respond to judicial decisions and thereby engage in a 
                                                          
11  Critiques of the Charter and the Supreme Court of Canada were constant and insistent, both 
before and after ‘Charter Dialogue’; among abundant examples, see F L Morton and Rainer 
Knopff, The Charter Revolution & The Court Party (Broadview Press, 2000) (stating, at 13, that 
the 1980s and 1990s will be remembered as the period of Canada’s ‘Charter Revolution’, when 
a long tradition of parliamentary supremacy was ‘replaced by a regime of constitutional 
supremacy verging on judicial supremacy’); see also K Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: 
Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Irwin Law Inc., 2001) (quoting the remarks of Vic 
Toews in 2001, at 3, that the Supreme Court of Canada has ‘engaged in a frenzy of constitutional 
experimentation that resulted in the judiciary substituting its legal and societal preferences for 
those made by the elected representatives of the people’). 
12  See Morton and Knopff, above n 11, 58 (stating that ‘[j]udicial intervention in the policymaking 
process is no longer ad hoc and sporadic … it has become systematic and continuous’); see also 
Roach, above n 11, 69-96 (chronicling the activism debate in Canada under the Charter). 
13  This is a Canadian sports team motto, used here with a cringe because the appeal to Canadian 
identity is on point and unwittingly plays off the ‘we the people’ preamble to the US 
Constitution.  
14  See J Cameron, ‘The Charter’s Legislative Override: Feat or Figment of the Constitutional 
Imagination’ in I Brodie and G Huscroft (eds) Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (LexisNexis 
Canada, 2004) 135, 137 (explaining how the Fathers of Confederation believed that the 
Constitution achieved a compromise that avoided the flaws of the US Constitution). 
15  Hogg and Thornton, above n 2, 78 (stating that the academic commentary advanced ‘ingenious 
theories to justify judicial review, and each new theory provoked a further round of criticism and 
new theories until the literature reached avalanche proportions’). 
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form of dialogue between institutions.16 In a compelling but unassuming way, the 
article’s evidence of statutory sequels demonstrated that the legislatures could and 
usually did respond to constitutional decisions.   
Styled that way, ‘Dialogue’ hardly threatened to upset conceptions of review in 
Canada, much less approach the lofty precincts of review theory and comparative 
constitutionalism.17   Ironically, though, given the emergence of weak- and strong-
form review, ‘Dialogue’ itself had weak and strong versions. The weak version, 
favoured by the authors, was that ‘Dialogue’ was descriptive rather than prescriptive.18 
The attempt to minimize it that way could not obscure the article’s ambitious and 
unconditional claims about review. The pronouncement that the democratic critique of 
judicial power could not be sustained under a concept of dialogue marked ‘Dialogue’’s 
critical juncture, because it amounted to an assertion that Charter review was 
presumptively and pre-emptively legitimate.19  That pronouncement is ‘Dialogue’’s 
‘strong’ version, and it rested on a conceit that the authors had overcome previously 
unresolvable doubts about the legitimacy of review.  Coupled with its sharp critique of 
American constitutionalism, the article read as a boast that Canada had created a 
superior model of rights protection.  
Courtesy of ‘Dialogue’, Canada could indulge a measure of smugness in knowing 
that the Charter had brought the legitimacy debate to an end. Charter review was on 
course because dialogue between institutions replaced the characteristic battle lines 
that define relations between US courts and legislatures.20 In substance as well as in 
tone, ‘Dialogue’ was an understated but unmistakeable exercise in constitutional self-
congratulation.  
Having boldly sidelined the US debate on review, the authors proceeded to their 
second strategy of disarming the central objection to the Charter – the emasculation of 
the legislatures – by showing that the legislatures are directly involved in questions of 
rights protection. On first impression, courts and legislatures look like equal winners 
under ‘Dialogue’, because each is in principle liberated from the other in exercising its 
respective function. As long as legislatures can respond to their decisions, judges in 
principle can be intrepid in enforcing constitutional rights, because the availability of 
legislative correctives will eliminate perennial, pervasive concerns about the exercise 
of power by an unelected judiciary.21 This aspect of Dialogue proved a boon to 
                                                          
16  Hogg, Thornton, and Wright, above n 7, 26 (stating that ‘Dialogue’’s essential point was that 
‘Charter decisions usually leave room for a legislative response, and usually receive a legislative 
response’). 
17  See A Petter, ‘Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue is 
Not Such a Good Thing After All)’ in ‘Ten Years Later’ above n 6, 166 (commenting on the 
‘banality’ of the ‘unremarkable insight’ that legislatures have the capacity to re-enact legislation 
after Charter decisions). 
18  Hogg, Thornton, and Wright, above n 7, 26 (stating that ‘Charter Dialogue’’s notion of dialogue 
was descriptive rather than normative). 
19  Hogg and Thornton, above n 2, 105. See P Hogg and A Thornton, ‘Reply to “Six Degrees of 
Dialogue”’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 529 (describing dialogue as a ‘helpful’ concept 
and adding, at 534, that ‘[w]e probably should not have said’ that the democratic critique of 
review cannot be sustained); see also ibid 4 (admitting that ‘[w]e perhaps went too far in 
suggesting that our study was “an answer” to the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review’). 
20  Kent Roach has been the keenest advocate of this view (claiming, in a book on the point, above 
n 11, 7, that the Charter broke new ground and that Canadians can lose sight of its genius by 
engaging in a debate on judicial activism that ‘remains mired in the deep tracks and dead ends of 
the American debate’). 
21  In other words, the answer to ‘objectionable’ judicial activism is legislative activism. Ibid 
(stating that all governments need to do is take responsibility for enacting legislation that 
justifiably limits or overrides rights). 
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Charter advocates, as well as to the Supreme Court itself.22 Yet the authors’ more 
essential point was that review does not diminish parliamentary tradition after all, 
because the process of dialogue gives legislatures the institutional room to advance and 
protect democratic preferences. In making that argument, Dialogue focused on s 1 and 
a data set which disclosed that legislatures were ‘almost always’ able to retool 
measures which – according to the courts – had miscalculated the balance between 
rights and democratic limits.23 As the authors explained, their evidence made it ‘hard 
to claim that an unelected court is thwarting the wishes of the people’.24  
On the surface, the article appealed to an idealized conception of institutional 
relations in which courts and legislatures shared power amicably under the Charter. At 
the time, the judiciary did not require much encouragement to enforce the Charter, and 
review got a boost because ‘Dialogue’ placed the onus on legislatures to claim and 
exercise their authority. In this, the article meant to convey the welcome news to those 
with concerns about judicial power that the legislature could and had been doing just 
that. In strategic terms, validating the legislature’s powers and opportunities to 
influence and even determine questions of rights protection was Dialogue’s central 
takeaway. Legitimizing that role was designed to deflect the arguments of the 
Charter’s critics for, as the authors later noted, ‘[t]hose who would prefer Canada to 
revert to a simple parliamentary democracy can take some comfort’ in the concept of 
dialogue.25  
In a context of, at times, profound controversy about the Charter, Dialogue’s 
claims were too powerful to be taken at face value. At first, commentators focused on 
the details of the article’s data set and methodology.26 In addition, the idea of 
‘dialogue’ was sceptically received by those who questioned whether legislatures are 
the equals of courts, and have sufficient legitimacy to participate in meaningful 
institutional dialogue on constitutionally protected entitlements.27 Moreover, not only 
was it ‘self-serving’ to describe the relationship between institutions as a dialogue, the 
concept ‘soft-peddle[d] the impact of judicial power on the democratic political 
processes’.28  
Before long, debate would move from analysis of ‘Dialogue’’s descriptive 
findings, or weak claim, to its strong views about the legitimacy of review. There, the 
article’s overstatement could not be easily defended and, as early as 1999, the authors 
retreated from the assertion that the democratic critique of review could not be 
sustained.29 Their follow-up strategy was an alternative position that Charter review 
                                                          
22  The Supreme Court explicitly invoked dialogue a number of times in this period. See, eg Vriend 
v Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Iacobucci J.). 
23  Hogg and Thornton, above n 2, 105. 
24  Ibid 87. 
25  Hogg, Thornton, and Wright above n 7, 29. 
26  See, eg, C Manfredi and J Kelly, ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell’ 
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 513 (‘Six Degrees’) (addressing the empirical 
methodology and data). 
27  Ibid 525 (stating, after questioning whether the relationship is equal or hierarchical, that ‘[t]he 
ability to manufacture and sustain a relationship between equals is critical to a genuine Charter 
dialogue’). 
28  F L Morton, ‘Dialogue or Monologue?’ (April 1999) Policy Options 23; G Huscroft, 
‘Constitutionalism from the Top Down’ in ‘Ten Years After’ above n 6, 103. 
29  P Hogg and A Thornton, ‘Reply to “Six Degrees of Dialogue”’, above n 19 (describing dialogue 
as a ‘helpful’ concept and adding, at 534, that ‘[w]e probably should not have said’ that the 
democratic critique of review cannot be sustained); see also Hogg, Thornton, and Wright, above 
n 7, 4 (admitting that ‘[w]e perhaps went too far in suggesting that our study was “an answer” to 
the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review’). 
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was at least weaker than judicial review in the US.30 Legitimacy concerns might not be 
eliminated but are less pronounced because of dialogue, and the authors – especially 
Hogg – continued to demonize American review. Due to dialogue, they claimed, the 
unsavoury court-packing and court-bashing of the US does not occur in Canada, 
because ‘[o]ur Court’s decisions do not matter as much’.31 
Significantly, ‘Dialogue’ was primarily concerned with s 1’s flexibility and how 
it enabled legislatures to respond; the override played little or no role in the initial 
conception of dialogue, having been dismissed by the authors as ‘relatively 
unimportant’.32  But s 1 could not take ‘Dialogue’’s lightning-rod claim about the 
presumptive legitimacy of review the distance, because democracy only has the last 
word when s 33 is engaged. Predictably, dialogue began to evolve in a different 
direction when the override emerged as ‘the big difference’ between review in Canada 
and the US.33 That shifted attention from whether legislatures have qualitative 
opportunities to respond to decisions, to a focus on this provision and whether it made 
the Charter fundamentally different by granting legislatures the power of the ‘last 
word’. That, of course, was the putative function of the override when it was adopted 
in 1982.  
Prior to 1982, fears that constitutional rights would Americanize Canada’s legal 
and political culture were widespread and powerful enough to defeat the Charter. In 
testy negotiations to resolve the standoff between rights-based and parliamentary 
supremacies, the override was ultimately what set Canada apart and saved the Charter. 
Section 33 was unquestionably a pawn in constitutional negotiations, but was also 
theorized at the time as a form of partnership or dialogue between institutions, and an 
antidote to predictions about the inevitability of importing US-style judicial activism. 
Paul Weiler provided the early leadership on this issue, maintaining that Canada had 
created a ‘distinctive constitutional partnership’ that offered an ‘intrinsically sound 
solution to the dilemma of rights and courts’.34 Specifically, he claimed that by 
adopting ‘a special form of dialogue between judge and legislator’, Canada would 
avoid the perils of a ‘full-blown judicial supremacy’.35 Meantime, Peter Russell 
                                                          
30  Ibid 29 (stating that ‘Charter Dialogue’ did not demonstrate that judicial review was good, but 
that judicial review under the Charter is weaker than generally supposed); Hogg, Thornton and 
Wright, above n 6, 201 (stating that ‘[w]hether judicial review in Canada is weak or strong is a 
matter on which wordsmiths may argue, but our conclusion is that judicial review in Canada is 
weaker than it is in the United States’). 
31  Hogg, Thornton and Wright, above n 6, 202; P Hogg, ‘Constitutional Dialogue Under a Bill of 
Rights’ (2007) 23 National Journal of Constitutional Law 127, 136 (‘Constitutional Dialogue’) 
(stating that the Court’s decisions in Canada do not matter as much because that is the effect of 
dialogue).  
32  Section 1 is the ‘reasonable limits’ provision, which allows legislatures to justify infringements 
of the Charter’s rights and freedoms; ‘Dialogue’ maintained that s 1’s flexibility both enabled 
and promoted legislative responses to decisions. Section 33 allows the legislatures to opt out and 
protect legislation from the Charter for a period of up to five years; that it is why it is called the 
‘override’ or ‘notwithstanding’ clause. Notably, certain guarantees are not subject to the s 33 
override: democratic rights (s 3); mobility rights (s 6); and language rights (ss 16-23). See above 
n 1. 
33  Hogg, Thornton, and Wright, above n 6, 200 (pointing again to s 1’s flexibility in enabling 
legislative sequels and then stating that s 33 is ‘the big difference’ which changes the balance of 
power between the judicial and legislative branches); Hogg, ‘Constitutional Dialogue’, above n 
31, 134 (stating also that the existence of an override in the US would have ‘changed 
everything’). 
34  ‘Rights and Judges in a Democracy:  A New Canadian Vision’ (1984) 18 University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform 51, 86, 80. 
35  P Weiler, ‘The Evolution of the Charter: A View From the Outside’ in Weiler and Elliot (eds) 
Litigating the Values of a Nation: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1986), 56. 
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acknowledged that while Canada ‘still teetered uncertainly between British and 
American models of government’, s 33 allowed for ‘shared responsibility’ through a 
‘prudent system of checks and balances that recognizes the fallibility of both courts 
and legislatures and gives closure to neither’.36 Moreover, even before ‘Charter 
Dialogue’ was written, Peter Hogg had praised the override as a remarkable innovation 
that rendered judicial review ‘suspensory’; he promised that ‘as long as the last word 
remains with the competent legislative body’, there could be ‘no acute or longstanding 
conflict between the judicial and legislative branches’.37 Revisiting this literature 
provides a stark reminder of Canada’s profound obsession with rights constitutionalism 
in this period. 
Section 33 was a polarizing concept and a way out: Canada would have 
constitutional rights, but there would be an asterisk. From one perspective, the override 
was presented as a passive safeguard that would not be used to diminish rights, and if 
at all would only be invoked in exceptional circumstances.38 From another perspective, 
the override was conceived of as a device that would be pressed into service, when 
needed, to preserve the democratic prerogative.39 In 1982, it was unknown how the 
override might affect the Charter’s evolution. To the extent legislatures became 
comfortable with it, s 33 might tip the balance away from courts and back toward the 
tradition of parliamentary supremacy. But if the override lacked political legitimacy 
and could only be used sparingly, that would redound to the benefit of judicial power. 
It was understood that the override was a pivot and that movement in either direction 
could set the Charter on a course that might be difficult to reverse. With relative 
institutional power in the balance, the enforcement of rights gained in the early years 
while the override’s prospects – although volubly discussed – seemed to dim.  In this 
way the override served to temper but not vanquish an opposition to rights which 
continued to flare with regularity in the Charter’s early years.40 
The parallels between the theory of the override and dialogue’s claim – that the 
final decision under the Charter is democratic – is no accident.41 Yet as noted, 
‘Dialogue’’s strong claim about the legitimacy of review did not depend so much on s 
1 or the data set of sequels but on the override, and whether s 33 set the Charter apart 
from the villainized US example.42 Not surprisingly, the override’s status as a 
                                                          
36  P Russell, ‘The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the Policymaking Role of the Canadian Courts’ 
(1982) 25 Canadian Public Administration 1, 32; P Russell, ‘Standing Up for Notwithstanding’ 
(1991) 29 Alberta Law Review 293 (‘Notwithstanding’), 301, 303. 
37  P Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (4th ed, 1997), 916-7. 
38  Repeatedly, at the time of adoption and for years afterward, the override was described as a 
stroke of genius, remarkable invention, and ‘honourable compromise’ that meets a ‘real 
democratic need in an age of constitutional charters and judicial activism’. That said, it was seen 
as a ‘wonderful safety valve – as long as it is rarely used’. ‘Reconciling Rights and Democracy’ 
Globe and Mail Editorial (4 February 1999); ‘A Clause That Refreshes’ Globe and Mail 
Editorial (18 September 2003).  
39  Among countless examples of this view see, for instance, A Petter, ‘Canada’s shield against 
despotic courts’ The Toronto Star (25 July 1989); A Hutchinson and A Petter, ‘Going Into 
Override’ in A Hutchinson (ed) Dwelling on the Threshold (1988) 233 (defending the override 
as a central pillar and encouraging legislatures to rely on it without apology); Russell, 
‘Notwithstanding’, above n 36, 298, 303 (endorsing the override’s merits, when properly used, 
as a way of countering the Charter’s flight from democratic politics). 
40  See, eg, R Fulford, ‘Charter of Wrongs’ (December 1986) Saturday Night, 7 (stating that the 
Charter is ‘absolutely and intrinsically American’ and imports the principle that ‘judges know 
better than politicians what is good for everyone’). 
41  Hogg and Bushell Thornton claimed in ‘Charter Dialogue’ that although the Charter placed 
constraints on the democratic process, ‘the final decision is the democratic one’. Above n 2, 80. 
42  Kent Roach was a strong proponent of the view that s 1 is the ‘real engine’ of dialogue. Above n 
11, 293.  
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transformative design feature that weakened or even eliminated legitimacy concerns 
depended on one’s point of view. For some, its formal existence necessarily weakened 
Charter review, because the legislatures could invoke the override at their option.43 
Others argued that the Charter would only be a system of weak-form review if the 
override, beyond existential presence in the text, actively checked the exercise of 
judicial power.44 Charter advocates maintained that the de jure availability of the 
override was sufficient – and conclusive of dialogue’s claims – regardless whether it 
was de facto available to legislatures. Yet in fact, if not in principle, the override was a 
‘paper tiger’, functionally incapable of setting up a counterpoint to the judiciary’s 
powers under the Charter.45 
‘Dialogue’’s heyday in Canada extended from 1997, the year of publication, to 
about 2007, when the Osgoode Hall Law Journal published a ten-year anniversary 
issue.46 The article marked a eureka moment in Canadian constitutionalism on arrival, 
because the authors made a daring and fairly convincing argument that it was not 
necessary to fear or oppose the judiciary’s enforcement of Charter rights. As noted 
earlier, it is and remains the first conception of Charter review to engage serious and 
sustained interest. In doing so, ‘Dialogue’ focussed the wrought emotions of the 
Charter’s founding generation on the pivotal question of whether Canada’s system of 
constitutional rights truly were different. The article revealed profound divisions about 
the Charter that were present from the outset, and manoeuvred them into a framework 
for debate based on the user-friendly concept of dialogue and its legitimacy-conferring 
properties.  
It seems safe to say that ‘Dialogue’’s descriptive account of legislative sequels 
would not have attracted wider interest or acclaim, without more. The rather 
astonishing claim that dialogue had eliminated legitimacy concerns invited theorists in 
and outside Canada to consider the plausibility of an institutional compromise between 
legislative and judicial supremacies.47 The central question was whether the override 
achieved a successful remit of legislative authority. As the discussion proceeded, the 
coining of terminology to differentiate strong- and weak-form review set Canada up as 
an example and pioneer of an alternative model of rights protection. Though it still 
bore too close a resemblance to US rights constitutionalism, Commonwealth 
jurisdictions looked to the Charter, attracted by the prospect of protecting rights 
without undue sacrifice to parliamentary tradition.48  
                                                          
43  Hogg, ‘Constitutional Dialogue’, above n 31, 135 (stating that ‘there is no reason to suppose that 
the current political reluctance to use s 33 is a permanent feature of the Canadian legal system’ 
and that s 33 was included ‘for the very purpose of preserving parliamentary sovereignty on 
rights issues’). 
44  A Petter, ‘Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously, above n 17, 160 (stating that although 
legislatures have de jure power under s 33, their inability to use that power results in courts 
having de facto the final say). 
45  See, eg, H Leeson, ‘Section 33, the Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?’ in Russell and 
Howe, (eds), ‘Choices: Courts and Legislatures’ (vol. 6, No. 2, 2000) 1. 
46  ‘Ten Years After’ above n 6. 
47  As promoted in Canada, ‘nothing in our constitution is so distinctively Canadian as this manner 
of reconciling the British tradition of responsible democratic government with the American 
tradition of judicially enforced constitutional rights’; P Russell and P Weiler, ‘Don’t scrap 
override clause – it’s a very Canadian solution’, The Toronto Star (4 June 1989). 
48  See generally S Gardbaum, ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ (2001) 49 
American Journal of Comparative Law 49 and S Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013 (original article and 
book by the leading discussant of this idea). 
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In due course it was almost beside the point whether Canada had successfully 
established weak or even weaker-form review.49 Regardless of how the override 
worked in practice, it opened constitutional vistas and made other forms of weak-form 
review possible. It is surprising that this insight came as such a revelation: that it was 
possible to re-conceptualize review, to sidestep  the monolith of strong-form US-style 
review, and to customize review by plotting  arrangements  along a sliding scale which 
re-mixed institutional powers in different ways. Systems that aimed to preserve a 
greater role for parliamentary supremacy could breathe more easily by placing 
themselves at a distance from the US and even Canada, toward the weak end of the 
review spectrum.  
Without question, ‘Dialogue’ radically exceeded expectations, including its own. 
How that happened is not only a matter of marvel, but also a source of insight on 
Canada’s experience of constitutional rights and on the enterprise of comparative 
constitutionalism writ large. Almost immediately, the concept of dialogue became the 
‘dominant paradigm’ in Canada and went on to achieve ‘reified’ status in the wider 
constitutional literature.50 The article’s modest set of data and initial dismissal of the 
override nonetheless set off a complex and sophisticated cottage-industry scholarship; 
in this way,  ‘dialogue’ would serve as a proxy for alternative models which attenuate 
review powers to retain elements of parliamentary supremacy. 
 Dialogue was not a runaway concept because the metaphor or rejoinder to review 
was particularly compelling.51 Moreover, as the authors acknowledge, it was not even 
original in the constitutional vocabulary.52 It is well imaginable that the concept could 
have incubated in another system of constitutional law, in a different time and place. It 
is curious and instructive that the concept of dialogue emerged in Canada instead.  
A transformative moment can occur when there is a point of constitutional 
ignition which fires the connection between an idea or concept and the prevailing 
constitutional angsts. ‘Charter Dialogue’ and ‘dialogue’ were constitutional 
phenomena for reasons which, in retrospect, are both obvious and fortuitous. Under the 
guise of modest observations resting on a limited data set, ‘Dialogue’ delivered a 
double knockout punch to the Charter’s foes. It appealed to constitutional patriotism, 
claiming that the dreaded US review saga was over in Canada, and introduced an 
attractive metaphor to prove that the parliamentary tradition, while altered, was safe 
under the Charter. Against the intense conflict that described the Charter’s origins, 
and the ongoing commiseration about how Canada had succumbed to judicial activism, 
it might have been more surprising if reaction to ‘Dialogue’ had not been so strong and 
reflexive.53 Much in the way of US theories and their goal of making sense of shifts in 
                                                          
49  Most are sceptical that the Charter represents weak-form review. See, M Tushnet, ‘New Forms 
of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries’ (2003) 38 
Wake Forest Law Review 813 (questioning whether weak-form review is robust or will 
necessarily degenerate either into strong-form review or parliamentary supremacy); Huscroft, 
‘Constitutionalism From the Top Down’, above n 28, and C Mathen, ‘Dialogue Theory, Judicial 
Review, and Judicial Supremacy: A Comment on ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited’ in ‘Ten Years 
After’ above n 7 (both concluding that the Charter is not a system of  weak-form review). 
50  C Manfredi and J Kelly, ‘Six Degrees’, above n 26, 524; A Kavanaugh, ‘The Lure and the 
Limits’, above n 5, 84. 
51  Kavanaugh, above n 5.  
52  ‘Charter Dialogue’ acknowledges as much; Hogg and Thornton, above n 2, n 12. See generally, 
Brian Slattery, ‘A Theory of the Charter’ (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 701 (proposing 
a ‘Co-ordinate Model’ of continuing dialogue between the courts and the legislatures); Barry 
Friedman, ‘Dialogue and Judicial Review’ (1993) 92 Michigan Law Review 577. 
53  Dialogue’s credibility owes much to the reputation of its lead author, Peter Hogg, who was and 
remains Canada’s foremost constitutional scholar.  
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the scope and substance of review, ‘Dialogue’ finds its roots and raison d’être in the 
deep controversy surrounding the Charter rights and the early activism of review. 
Nor was it predictable that ‘Dialogue’ would travel so widely in scholarly circles 
outside Canada. There, as well, the article’s unexpected celebrity can be traced to two 
elements: the claim that the legitimacy riddle had been solved, which challenged the 
then current orthodoxy; and the creation of a textual mechanism which – and albeit in 
disuse – appeared to move the institutional goalposts back toward democratic 
authority. The override’s genius, as so many Canadian scholars have described it, was 
to make an argument for weak-form review possible and cultivate the movement 
toward alternative conceptions of rights protection. 
In all this, ‘Charter Dialogue’ served the purposes of Canadian constitutional 
patriotism rather well.54 How it served theory’s purposes may be another matter. 
 
 
II   THEORY AND METAPHOR 
 
There is much constitutional theory in the literature, and much theory about 
constitutional theory. Over the years the theory of constitutional theory has fretted in 
the main about the academic integrity of the enterprise. Specifically, the dilemma has 
been one of ‘struggling for theoretical consistency’ and seeking ‘transcendent 
perspectives’ which may be impossible, because ‘the grist for the constitutional 
scholarship mill’ is simply and unavoidably ‘too political to sustain enduring theory’.55 
In the face of a legitimacy debate that was pronounced ‘essentially incoherent and 
irresolvable’ some years ago,56 noted scholars have opted out and declared themselves 
to be against theory and in favour of non-theoretical approaches.57 Under a view that 
recognizes the renunciation of theory as theory, the standard for determining what is 
and is not theory has become minimal.58 The slide to relativism may be unavoidable in 
a discourse that has had to accept that, despite best efforts, there might not be ‘one best 
constitutional theory for all time’.59 
Thus far, there is little of grand theory in Canadian constitutional scholarship. 
Though the source of that diffidence is unclear, exploring it further is beyond the scope 
of this exercise. At the least it is instructive here that the authors of ‘Dialogue’ were 
careful to issue a disclaimer that its central concept was not a theory, and 
commentators were quick to agree that dialogue should not be mistaken for theory.60 
Despite generating a theoretical scholarship, the Charter – as yet and apart from what 
                                                          
54  See D Law and M Versteeg, ‘The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution’ (2012) 
New York University Law Review, 87:3, 762-858, 801-23 (asking, ‘Is Canada a Constitutional 
Superpower’ and discussing Canada’s status as a ‘constitutional trendsetter’ among common law 
or Commonwealth countries). 
55  Friedman, ‘The Cycles of Constitutional Theory’, above n 8, 150. 
56  P Brest, ‘The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship’ (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1063 (also concluding, at 1065, that ‘no 
defensible criteria’ exist to assess theories of judicial review). 
57  Best known among them is R Posner, ‘Against Constitutional Theory’ (1998) 73 New York 
University Law Review 1. 
58  In addition to Friedman and Posner, see generally R Fallon Jr., ‘How to Choose a Constitutional 
Theory’ (1999) 87 California Law Review 535; M. Dorf, ‘Create Your Own Constitutional 
Theory’ (1999) 87 California Law Review 593; and D Strauss, ‘What is Constitutional Theory?’ 
(1999) 87 California Law Review 581 (1999) 
59  Fallon, ibid 569. 
60  Hogg, Thornton, and Wright, ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited’, above n 7, 27-8 (agreeing that 
dialogue is not a justification or theory of review); Petter, ‘Much Too Seriously’ above n 17, 166 
(stating that dialogue does not ‘tell us much of anything about the legitimacy of review’). 
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dialogue offers – has not developed other theories of review that have had substantial 
take-up in rights discourse. 
There is also the matter of the metaphor, which gave the authors’ underlying 
argument a magnetic image and substantially helped in establishing the concept of 
metaphor as a constitutional phenomenon. Perhaps for that reason, the metaphor 
provoked significant backlash, mainly on grounds that it was substantively 
meaningless and distorts the judiciary’s influence on the policy-making process of 
democratic decision-making.61 Even so, the first amendment’s pyrotechnics and 
Canada’s living tree doctrine attest that metaphors are not unknown to constitutional 
discourse and are a familiar part of the vocabulary.62 It is recognized, as well, that a 
metaphor can be ‘suggestive’, ‘evocative’, and ‘evaluatively loaded’, and can provide a 
‘useful shortcut to understanding complex phenomena’.63  
In dialogue’s case, divergent points of view start from different points of 
departure. A framing question is whether the concept of dialogue should be taken, in 
more or less literal terms, to mean no more than the existence of any kind of exchange. 
The other view is that the concept must incorporate a qualitative element, such as the 
relative equality of the parties, to count as a true dialogue between institutions.64 That 
said, it is unclear why some metaphors fare better than others and is not self evident, 
for instance, why the ‘living tree’ – which seems equally open to wildly varying 
interpretations – might provide a better shortcut to complex phenomena.65 This kind of 
selectivity sounds in much the same register as debate about theory, and may represent 
a similar predisposition for or against the underlying prescriptive idea at stake.66  
At this point helpful advice can be taken: ‘[f]orget for the moment what side you 
are on, assuming you are sure of that’, and ‘[j]ust sit back and think about what all this 
means for constitutional scholarship and theory’.67 A few simple propositions are 
reasonably well-founded. One is that no theory has resolved the legitimacy debate, and 
that includes ‘Dialogue’ as well as the collective efforts of generations of US review 
theorists. Second, there is little consensus on what constitutes theory, much less on 
                                                          
61  See Petter, ‘Much Too Seriously’, above n 17; Kavanaugh, ‘The Lure and the Limits’, above n 
5. 
62  See, eg, R Tsai, ‘Fire, Metaphor and Constitutional Myth-Making’ (2004) 93 Georgetown Law 
Journal 183 (exploring the role of metaphor in the free speech context). On the living tree, see 
generally V Jackson, ‘Constitutions as “Living Trees”? Comparative Constitutional Law and 
Interpretive Metaphors’ 75 Fordham Law Review (2006) 921, 941-60 (thoughtfully discussing 
the living tree’s possibilities and drawbacks); W Waluchow, ‘Constitutions as Living Trees: An 
Idiot Defends’ (2005) 18 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 207 (defending a living-
tree conception of the Charter informed by a common law model and partnership with other 
government bodies); A Kavanugh, ‘The Idea of a Living Constitution’ (2003) 16 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 55 (providing a ‘sensible account’ of the living tree, and 
making the metaphor ‘more intelligible’). 
63  Kavanaugh, ‘The Lure and the Limits’, above n 5, 88, 89. 
64  Hogg, Thornton, and Wright, ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited’, above n 7, 7 (stating that ‘we are not 
interested in debating the critics’ on whether dialogue is the proper word to use) and 26 
(repeating that anyone could disagree with the choice and since no one has suggested a better 
word there is no reason to agonize over the original choice). 
65  See Kavanaugh, ‘The Lure and the Limits’, above n 5, 88. Kavanaugh states that while the living 
tree is sometimes invoked to describe the nature of interpretation, it is more often used to 
endorse creative decision-making and to provide an ‘attractive underpinning’ to a normative 
argument about how judges should engage in constitutional interpretation. Without fully 
elaborating the comparison, dialogue’s distorting properties, discussed in full, are the metaphor’s 
death-knell for Kavanaugh. 
66  Posner, ‘Against Constitutional Theory’, above n 57, 3 (claiming that constitutional theory only 
works for those who are predisposed to agree with its prescriptions). 
67  Friedman, above n 8, 164. 
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what criteria should be used to separate good and bad theory. Third, these impasses 
support an approach that is more relative, outcome-neutral, and modest in aspiration. 
Specifically, and as suggested above, a good question is simply to ask what any theory 
has done to animate, provoke, or generate a scholarly discourse that deepens 
understanding of constitutional interpretation, judicial review, and institutional 
relations.  
From that perspective, it is not necessary to make extravagant claims about 
Dialogue or raise the threshold for determining what is theory. It can be agreed that the 
concept failed to deliver an authoritative account of institutional relations in self-styled 
weak-form systems of review, and did not resolve age-old issues about the legitimacy 
of review. A deeper analysis might also reveal that it falls short on other measures, and 
whether or how much it distorts is a matter for scholarly disagreement. Despite those 
limits, ‘Dialogue’ hotwired an idea that attracted sustained scholarly treatment, in 
Canada, the US and the Commonwealth. Timely and important, it animated, provoked 
and generated an impressive scholarship of engagement with its landmark metaphor. In 
that it has served theory’s purposes rather well.68  
 
 
III   DIALOGUE’S LEGACY 
 
Today, dialogue is for the most part a muted concept in Canada. Despite the 
Supreme Court’s far-reaching Charter decisions in recent years and an at times stormy 
relationship with the last federal government, the anti-review rhetoric of Dialogue’s 
heyday is largely absent in current Canadian discourse. For reasons that are unclear 
and are in any case beyond the scope of this reflection, the legitimacy issue is in partial 
remission at present.69  
Though it would be unwise to attribute too much to dialogue, it is possible that 
the concept has helped to stabilize the Charter and smooth its passage in recent years. 
Though perceived by its detractors as a rationalization of judicial activism, the concept 
of dialogue is bi-directional and the last word belongs to legislatures, even if 
dormantly, at their option. As well, it is difficult to know how much the Court was 
bruised by the brouhaha on activism in the late 1990s. Since then, the Court and 
current Chief Justice have been careful to manage institutional relations in a way that – 
at least in their perception – fulfills the Charter mandate without unnecessarily 
irritating democratically elected bodies.70 Even if not in balance, each side in this 
                                                          
68  As Tushnet quipped, ‘[p]erhaps weak-form systems of judicial review provide more in the way 
of academic interest than they contribute to solving practical problems of governance’, in which 
case, he added, ‘[a]n academic will not take that as a criticism of weak-form judicial review’. 
‘New Forms of Judicial Review’, above n 49, 838. 
69  A political culture that has become ‘increasingly hostile’ to the idea that ‘political disagreements 
with judicial interpretations of the Charter represent appropriate constitutional options’ is one 
possibility. J Hiebert, ‘Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?’ (2006) 69 Modern 
Law Review 7, 27 (also stating that Canadians are ‘remarkably insensitive’ about alternatives to 
American-style review, and that Canada’s response to the Charter has been ‘largely shaped by 
prevailing assumptions’ at the time of its creation, which accepted ‘the logic of judicial 
supremacy’). 
70  For instance, the Chief Justice has stated that ‘[t]he courts have to be respectful of Parliament’s 
role and the executive’s role’, and added that ‘I think you can see this in our decisions’. She 
continued, commenting that ‘[w]e’re often giving a measure of deference to ministerial 
decisions’ and we often say ‘and it’s not just lip service – that Parliament has a right to make 
these and other choices’. In her view, the respect should flow in both directions: ‘I think the 
people in government have to treat the courts with respect, otherwise we will undermine our 
system and it won’t work very well’. Quoted in J Brean, ‘“Conscious Objectivity”: That’s how 
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dialogue shadows the other: just as the override stands in the paramount shadow of 
review, the power of review stands in the ever-present shadow of the legislature’s last 
word.  
The recent interplay between the Supreme Court of Canada and Parliament on 
assisted dying is reminiscent of episodes in the history of dialogue from the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.71 In its 2015 decision invalidating the Criminal Code’s prohibition on 
assisted dying, the Supreme Court granted Parliament a grace period of one year, and 
then an extension, for responding with new legislation.72 Bill C-14, which was enacted 
in June 2016 appears, on its face, more restrictive of the Charter right to choose death 
than the Court’s decision indicated. Armchair constitutionalists were quick to 
pronounce Bill C-14 unconstitutional because it did not adopt the Court’s language; the 
claim, in other words, was that Parliament was under constitutional orders from the 
Court.73  Others regarded this as an instance of dialogue, in which the legislature’s 
prerogative to respond differently, with a regime that shines its own best lights on the 
issue, should be respected.74 Whether Parliament has the last word will be up to the 
Court, and in that process the dialogue between institutions will remain under debate.  
At least in cultural terms, an organic process, in which an unformed concept of 
dialogue invisibly shapes perceptions and expectations about institutional relations is 
largely accepted.  
What led me to choose this law review article as my favourite was its discussion 
of dialogue and how it came to represent a new and important cycle in Canadian 
constitutional thought. The genesis and movement of perceptions about rights and 
review, from 1982 to 1997 when ‘Dialogue’ appeared, are formative in the Charter’s 
history and a foundational part of Canadian constitutionalism. ‘Dialogue’ might not be 
Canada’s ‘best constitutional theory for all time’, but it set a baseline for cycles of 
constitutional theory under the Charter and had a critical impact on review theory and 
comparative constitutionalism. The  discourse on review is quiet at present but that will 
change, and dialogue will be followed by the next cycle of Charter theory.    
                                                                                                                                            
the chief justice defines the top court’s role. Harper might beg to differ’, National Post (23 May 
2015). 
71 See C Manfredi, ‘The Day Dialogue Died: A Comment on Sauvé v Canada’ in ‘Ten Years 
Later’, above n 6. 
72  Carter v Canada (Attorney General), [2-15] 1 S.C.R. 331; Carter v Canada, 2016 SCC 4 
(granting Parliament an extension on the suspended declaration of invalidity). 
73  Bill C-14, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and Make Related Amendments to Other Acts 
(medical assistance in dying) 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2016 (assented to 16 June 2016).  
74  J Simpson, ‘How Not to Make a Law’, Globe & Mail (2 June 2016, online), A13: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/globe-politics-insider/jeffrey-simpson-
medically-assisted-dying-how-not-to-make-a-law/article30239186/>; S Grammond, ‘Parliament 
isn’t bound to “cut and paste” court rulings into law’, Globe & Mail, (30 June 2016):  
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/parliament-isnt-bound-to-copy-and-paste-rulings-
into-law/article30687631/>.  
 
